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9The Domestic Politics of International Children’s
Rights: A Dutch Perspective
jasper krommendijk*
Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of whether theUNhuman rights treaty
bodies− and especially theUNCommittee on the Rights of theChild (CRC
Committee) − act as engines for incorporating universal norms at the
domestic level. Elements of such incorporation manifest, among other
ways, in the extent to which a state changes its policy and/or legislation
(partly) on the basis of the recommendations of these human rights treaty
bodies. This chapter will also explore the factors which determine whether
treaty body recommendations are implemented, or not.
Koskenniemi has argued that politics is about different conceptions of
justice, and justice is inherently political.1 In other words, he treats
politics and justice as closely interrelated. In various ways, this observa-
tion also underlies this chapter on the domestic impact of the work of UN
human rights treaty bodies on state reporting procedures. First, the work
of the treaty bodies is aimed at the realisation of justice by monitoring the
implementation of international human rights treaties. This was noted by
former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon when he argued that: ‘the treaty
bodies stand at the heart of the international human rights protection
system as engines translating universal norms into social justice’.2
* This chapter is based on Krommendijk’s PhD research conducted from November 2009
until March 2014, which focused on state reporting under the six main UN human rights
treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Finland. See Jasper Krommendijk,
The Domestic Impact and Effectiveness of the Process of State Reporting under UN
Human Rights Treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland: Paper-Pushing or
Policy Prompting? (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014).
1 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
2 Ban Ki-moon, ‘Foreword by the Secretary-General’, in Navi Pillay, Strengthening the
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System (2012), 7. www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf
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Second, as will be illustrated in this chapter, treaty bodies are very much
engaged with politics as well. For example, they interpret open-ended
treaty provisions, they formulate recommendations, and they decide how
to handle information submitted by NGOs. Such acts are inherently
political and imply dealing with, in the view of Koskenniemi in
Chapter 2 of this book, the ‘two completely different conceptual worlds’
of the legal and the political.3 Third, the process of implementation of
non-binding recommendations from international legal institutions is
essentially political. As will be shown in this chapter, non-legal aspects
frequently determine whether the recommendations are acted upon at
the domestic level. (Non-)compliance is primarily affected by political
interests and preferences of the government. (Non-)compliance with
recommendations is thus the result or byproduct of domestic politics.4
The argument that there is a political dimension to the implementation
of international norms also coincides with Koskenniemi’s claim that
international law should not ‘escape politics’ or treat politics as opposed
to international law.5 Similarly, the ﬁght for an international rule of law
should not be seen as a ﬁght against politics, but a ﬁght which takes place
within politics.6 This also implies that international norms and recom-
mendations only have effect through the ﬁlter of domestic politics.7
Hence, this chapter concurs with Koskenniemi’s argument that ‘social
conﬂict must still be solved by political means’.8 Fourth, the examination
of this domestic political implementation process requires venturing into
other disciplines than law, including political science, international rela-
tions, and sociology, as Koskenniemi noted in the early 1990s.9
The UN human rights state reporting procedures are based on the
obligations of states which have ratiﬁed, or acceded to, these treaties (the
states parties) to submit periodically, usually every four or ﬁve years,
a report on the implementation of this treaty.10 These state reports are
3 See Chapter 2, 25.
4 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’, Yale Law Journal, 111
(2002), 1935–2042.
5 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ European Journal of
International Law, 1 (1990), 4–32 at 6.
6 Ibid. 5.
7 Martha Finnemore and Kathryne Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change’, International Organization, 52 (1998), 887–917, 893.
8 Koskenniemi, ‘Politics of International Law’ (1990), 7.
9 Ibid. 32.
10 The six main UN human rights treaties that were included in this research and chapter are
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660 UNTS 195
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examined by an independent committee of experts (a ‘treaty body’),
through a so-called constructive dialogue with representatives of the
state party. Civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
are allowed to submit alternative and/or additional information to the
treaty body. The assessment of a state report ends with the adoption of
Concluding Observations (COs) by the treaty body, which contain sugges-
tions and recommendations for improving implementation of the treaty
standards. As stated earlier, these COs are non-binding in technical legal
terms. This chapter will particularly focus on the reporting process of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as regards the
Netherlands, in order to explain the fact that the Dutch government has
introduced laws and policies to give effect to some of the COs.11
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section will
examine two theoretical explanations for the impact of COs that have
inspired the empirical analysis for this chapter. The third section will
examine the state reporting process conducted by the six treaty bodies
and will provide four examples of COs of the CRC Committee that have
been acted upon. The fourth section will explain the role of the CRC
Committees’ COs in the Netherlands on the basis of the two theoretical
hypotheses and other factors.
Theorising the Homecoming of International Recommendations
As explained above, this chapter analyses the extent to which the Dutch
government has taken any policy or legislative measures on the basis of the
COs. The methodology used to conduct this analysis primarily consists of
(opened for signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) (ICERD); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR); the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR); the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (opened for
signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) (CEDAW); the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into
force 26 June 1987) (CAT); and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force
2 September 1990) (CRC).
11 To date, the CRC Committee has examined the Dutch situation four times, in 1999, 2004,
2009, and 2015. As the research project that was the basis for this chapter ended in 2014,
and at the moment of writing it was rather early to assess the follow-up to the June 2015
COs, the latest set of COs has not been analysed here.
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an examination of documents in which show that the government pro-
vided a reaction to the COs. These documents include in particular the
periodic state reports and letters to Parliament. This analysis was comple-
mented by sixty-three interviews with Dutch government ofﬁcials and
NGO and UNICEF representatives.12 These interviews included twelve
(former) Dutch government ofﬁcials from ﬁve different ministries who
had been involved in the process of CRC state reporting by way of drafting
the state report and attending the dialogue with the CRC Committee in
Geneva in 1999, 2004, and/or 2009.13 In total, eight representatives from
four different NGOs14 involved in the CRC reporting process and from the
Dutch National UNICEF Committee were interviewed as well. First of all,
the interviewees were asked to give examples of implemented COs them-
selves (see the two columns on the right of Table 1). Second, the inter-
viewees were askedwhether particular COs have played a role in policy and
legislative measures and in what way(s).
In addition to an analysis of the level of implementation of COs, this
chapter explores why policy or legislative measures have (or have not)
been taken on the basis of COs. The latter question has also been
addressed in international relations literature on international norm
compliance and implementation. In this chapter, two theoretical expla-
nations will be provided: the compliance pull, and domestic and transna-
tional mobilisation.15
Legitimacy and Compliance Pull
Legally speaking, COs are non-binding, and the treaty bodies lack instru-
ments to enforce and coerce compliance with their recommendations.
12 In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, their names and identities are not
disclosed. Instead, a randomly generated series of numbers (government ofﬁcials) and
letters (NGO representatives) will be used for reference. The summary reports of the
interviews are on ﬁle with the author and can be accessed upon request.
13 Ofﬁcials of the followingministries were interviewed: theMinistry of Health,Welfare and
Sport; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment; the Ministry of Youth and Families (in existence during the
period 2007–2010).
14 Representatives of the following NGOs were interviewed: the Dutch section of Defence
for Children International; Justitia et Pax; the Dutch section of the International
Commission of Jurists (NJCM); and the Johannes Wier Foundation.
15 For a more elaborate account, see also Jasper Krommendijk, ‘The Domestic Effectiveness
of International Human Rights Monitoring in Established Democracies: The Case of the
UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’, Review of International Organizations, 10 (2015),
489–512.
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A ﬁrst theoretical implication of this feature of COs is that their imple-
mentation is contingent upon the extent to which the treaty bodies and
their output exert a normative compliance pull. It has been pointed out
that legitimacy is especially crucial when courts or other institutions lack
coercive means.16 Alvarez, for example, has argued that ‘legitimacy is the
missing link in solving the mystery of how the international system
obliges without a coercive force’.17 Similarly, Franck has observed that
‘legitimacy has the power to pull toward compliance those who cannot be
compelled’.18 Legitimacy strongly relates to subjective perception and
belief systems of actors.19 For the implementation of COs it is therefore
crucial that governments feel bound to comply with the COs, even
though formally they are non-binding. This compliance pull depends
among other things on government ofﬁcials’ perceptions as to the legiti-
macy, usefulness, persuasiveness, and legal quality of the COs, as well as
the authority of the relevant treaty body. Based on this theoretical insight,
this chapter will further rely on the attitudes and perceptions of Dutch
government ofﬁcials concerning the process of state reporting, the CRC
Committee, and the COs. Information was gathered on these perceptions
through semi-structured interviews with government ofﬁcials. In order
to determine whether a compliance pull existed, questions were raised
about the views of ofﬁcials concerning the quality of the constructive
dialogue with the CRC Committee, the COs, and the treaty bodies.
Domestic and Transnational Human Rights
Mobilisation and Advocacy
The second compliance mechanism that features in this chapter deals with
domestic and transnational human rights mobilisation and advocacy.
Liberal international relations scholars have argued that international insti-
tutions are able to change the behaviour of a state through domestic
institutions, such as domestic courts, and by mobilising domestic advocacy
16 James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, ‘The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions:
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice’, American Journal of Political
Science, 39/2 (1995), 459–489 at 460, 470.
17 Jose Alvarez, ‘Book Review Essay: The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of the
Power of Legitimacy among Nations by Thomas M. Franck’, International Law and
Politics, 24 (1991), 199–267 at 206.
18 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and Institutions (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), at 24, 26.
19 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International
Organization, 53/2 (1999), 379–408 at 381; Alvarez, ‘Book Review’, 206.
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groups, NGOs, or political parties that pressure governments to change
behaviour.20 Several studies have even concluded that domestic change on
the basis of international norms is unlikely to happen unless domestic actors
take them up and demand change.21 Moravcsik has maintained that inter-
national human rights institutions ‘coopt’ domestic actors who conse-
quently pressure their governments for compliance ‘from within’. He has
concluded that international norms and institutions can shift the balance of
power within and between domestic actors and prompt a change in coali-
tions and calculations underlying governmental policies, which might even-
tually lead to a policy change.22 Likewise, Alter has held that international
courts can act as ‘tipping point actors’ who support domestic compliance
constituencies and provide them with ‘resources’. In this way, they can tip
the political balance in favour of policies in line with international norms.23
Dai’s theory on domestic compliance constituencies as ‘decentralised enfor-
cers’ has noted how international norms and institutions can create a focal
point for domestic actors and strengthen their leverage and legitimise their
demands.24 This also reﬂects Simmons’ domestic politics theory on com-
pliance with human rights treaties as ‘a tool to support political
mobilisation’.25 This domestic mobilisation mechanism mirrors Keck and
Sikkink’s ‘boomerang effect’, which describes how coalitions of domestic
compliance constituencies and NGOs seek international support and link
up with transnational networks to bring pressure on their states from the
outside. These international linkages allow such coalitions to gain leverage
by introducing new issues, norms, and discourses into the debate and
strengthening and amplifying their demands so that the terms of the debate
20 Hathaway, ‘Human Rights Treaties’, 1954. Likewise, constructivist international relations
theorists have pointed to the important role of domestic ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who use
international norms to reinforce their (minority) position in domestic discussions and act
as ‘agents of socialisation’ by demanding a policy or legislative change. Finnemore and
Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’, 893, 902.
21 See e.g. Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘From Europeanisation to Diffusion:
Introduction’, West European Politics, 35/1 (2012), 1–19 at 11.
22 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory
and Western Europe’, European Journal of International Relations, 1/2 (1995, 157–89.
23 Karen Alter, ‘Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction of
International and Domestic Politics’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 13
(2012), 1–21, at 1, 5.
24 Xinyuan Dai, ‘Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism’, International
Organization, 59 (2005), 363–98.
25 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 135.
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can shift.26 In that way, they pressure states simultaneously from above and
from below.27
In light of this theoretical premise, the extent to which domestic actors
in the Netherlands have picked up, discussed, and utilised COs to lobby
and pressure the Dutch government will be examined in the next section.
This is supported by an analysis of parliamentary papers, court judg-
ments, newspaper articles, and NGO websites for the period from
1 September 1995 until 31 August 2011.28 In addition, government
ofﬁcials and NGO representatives were asked about their ideas concern-
ing the impact of COs during the interviews.
The Implementation of the COs of the CRC Committee:
A Positive Exception in the Netherlands
Generally speaking, the Dutch government has hardly taken measures as
a direct result of COs from the six UN human rights treaty bodies.29
To the contrary, the government has rejected some of the concerns and
recommendations of the treaty bodies.30 In this context, it has produced
26 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International
and Regional Politics’, International Social Science Journal, 51/1 (1999), 89–101 at 90, 93;
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and
Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38 at 18.
27 Risse and Sikkink, ‘Socialization’, 5.
28 These documents were traced by using, respectively, Parlando, zoek.ofﬁcielebekendma-
kingen.nl, rechtspraak.nl, Lexis Nexis, and Google Search. The search terms and results
are on ﬁle with the author and are available upon request.
29 See also the introduction to this book (Chapter 1), which refers to Koskenniemi’s
observation that ‘the rhetoric of law’ has lost its ‘transformative effect’ because of ‘over-
legalistic explanations’ as a result of which it is ‘not as powerful as it claims to be’
(Chapter 1, 13); Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart,
2011), 133. It likewise coincided with Oomen’s studies of the disconnect between national
and global justice. Barbara Oomen, Rights for Others: The Slow Home-Coming of Human
Rights in the Netherlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
30 For further elaboration on this and other points, for CEDAW, ICERD, and ICCPR in
speciﬁc, see Jasper Krommendijk, ‘The Impact and Effectiveness of State Reporting under
the Women’s Convention: The Case of the Netherlands’, in Ingrid Westendorp, ed.,
The Women’s Convention Turned 30: Achievements, Setbacks, and Prospects (Antwerpen:
Intersentia, 2012), 487–512; Jasper Krommendijk, ‘The (Non-) Implementation of
Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in
the Netherlands Explained’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 13 (2012),
462–79; Jasper Krommendijk, ‘De Beperkte Effectiviteit van de Aanbevelingen van het
VN-Mensenrechtencomité in Nederland nader bekeken en verklaard’ [The Limited
Effectiveness of the Recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee in the
190 politics of international children ’s rights
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various potential justiﬁcations for its positions, including budgetary
constraints, a deliberate policy decision of a democratically elected leg-
islature, or a conﬂict with other international obligations. In other
instances, the government has simply argued that it did not agree with
the assessment of the treaty body and that, for example, sufﬁcient safe-
guards were already in place.
A further, plausible reason for the absence of any follow-upmeasures on
the part of the Dutch government is that many of the rather broad and
unspeciﬁc COs did not outline a speciﬁc course of action. Several COs
have merely recommended the government to ‘continue its efforts’31
‘strengthen measures’,32 ‘continue and further strengthen its efforts’,33
and even ‘further strengthen the measures already taken’.34 Other COs
have recommended the Dutch government to ‘take all necessary
measures’35 or ‘take all appropriatemeasures’36 without including concrete
suggestions. Hence, the government has usually made clear that measures
have (already) been taken that are in line with or address the COs sufﬁ-
ciently. COs have, thus, frequently coincided with measures already in
place and what the government was already doing. The absence of such
follow-up measures on the part of the government corresponds to the
scepticism of Koskenniemi about signing a domestic bill of rights or any of
the international human rights treaties. He regards the signing of such
documents as a mere re-description of the existing reality, without any
tangible effects.37
There are, however, also a couple of COs that have led to policy or
legislative changes or additional measures.38 Eleven of the twenty-four
measures that were taken on this basis in the Netherlands related to COs
of the CRC Committee, while the other thirteen measures were related to
Netherlands: A Closer Examination and Explanation], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de
Mensenrechten-NJCM/Bulletin, 38/2 (2013), 212–28.
31 See e.g. UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (2004), para. 22.
32 Ibid. para. 23.
33 See e.g. UN Doc. CRC/C/NLD/CO/3 (2009), para. 23.
34 Ibid. para. 68.
35 See e.g. UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (2004), paras. 34 (b), 46, 48, 50.
36 See e.g. UN Doc. CRC/C/NLD/CO/3 (2009), paras. 29, 52, 74 (e), 81, 83.
37 See Chapter 2 of this book.
38 Examples of implemented COs of other treaty bodies include the SGP court case (invol-
ving gender discrimination by a government-funded political party) and the evaluation of
the gender dimension of the asylum policy (both relating to CEDAW); the increased
domestic attention and debate about central storage of ﬁngerprints (ICCPR); the integra-
tion of medical reports in the asylum procedure (CAT); and the increased domestic
attention to school segregation (ICERD).
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COs of the other ﬁve treaty bodies (Table 1).39 The rest of this section will
discuss the four implemented COs listed ﬁrst in the table below as
illustrations of this ‘CRC exception’.
Example 1: The Establishment of a Children’s Ombudsman
On three occasions, the CRC Committee has recommended the estab-
lishment of a Children’s Ombudsman to monitor the implementation
of the CRC at the national level in the Netherlands.40 The government
was rather dismissive of the committee’s recommendation on the ﬁrst
occasion in 1999.41 These reservations notwithstanding, the ﬁrst
Children’s Ombudsman eventually took ofﬁce on 1 April 2011.
The establishment of this ofﬁce was the direct result of a legislative
proposal byMember of Parliament (MP) Arib of the Dutch labour party
(PvdA). Arib explicitly stated that her legislative proposal stemmed
from the recommendations of the CRC Committee.42 It is noteworthy
that on nineteen occasions several other MPs also mentioned the COs
as a reason for the establishment of the Children’s Ombudsman (see
Table 1).43 This illustrates that the COs gave a necessary push and
offered additional support for Arib’s proposal and also reinforced the
arguments of other proponents. One interviewee even argued that the
39 The ﬁndings for the Netherlands do not stand alone. The implementation of the COs of
the CRCCommittee was also better than that of the COs of the other treaty bodies in New
Zealand. Eleven out of the twenty implemented COs in the New Zealand were from the
CRCCommittee. This outcome was attributed to the strategic use of the reporting process
and the COs by the Ministry of Youth Affairs, the advocacy by NGOs, and the Children’s
Commissioner. Jasper Krommendijk, ‘Can Mr. Zaoui Freely Cross the Foreshore and
Seabed? The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms in New
Zealand’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 43/4 (2012), 579–615.
40 UN Doc. CRC/C/90 (1999), para. 12; UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (2004), paras. 8, 20,
21; UN Doc. CRC/C/NLD/CO/3, paras. 8, 16, 17.
41 The government did not see a need for the establishment of an ombudsman, because
several of the ombudsman’s potential activities were already being undertaken by other
institutions. In addition, the government pointed to budgetary constraints.
The government also held that the CRC does not require this either. See UN Doc.
CRC/C/117/Add.1 (2002), para. 31; TK 2003/04, 29200 VI, nr. 21, 85; TK 2003/04,
29200 VI, nr. 96, 5.
42 The initial proposal was already submitted by Arib and Van Vliet (D66) in 2001.
The proposal was, however, not considered until Arib took up the issue again in 2009.
See TK 2001/02, 28102, nr. 3; TK 2009/10, 31831, nr. 1–3 and 9, 20.
43 See e.g. the statements made by Slagter-Roukema (SP), De Vries-Leggedoor (CDA) and
Hamer (PvdA). EK 2009/10, nr. 32, 1373–6 at 1373–5. See also the references made by
Langkamp (SP) TK 2009/10, nr. 79, 6765–77 at 6765.
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Children’s Ombudsman would not have been established had the com-
mittee not recommended it in its COs of 1999.44 One representative of
the Dutch section of the NGO Defence for Children International
mentioned that NGOs would not have been so wound up about estab-
lishing a Children’s Ombudsman had the committee not emphasised
this issue so much.45 Both government ofﬁcials and NGO representa-
tives stressed the crucial role of the pressure and political interest of
Parliament in the implementation of the COs.46
The role of the NGOs and UNICEF was also identiﬁed as an impor-
tant factor. Arib wrote her proposal together with representatives from
the Dutch National UNICEF Committee and the Dutch section of
Defence for Children.47 In addition, the speciﬁcity of the COs was
highlighted as a factor contributing to their implementation.48 It was
also considered important that the then Minister for Youth and
Families, Rouvoet of the Christian Union (Christen Unie or CU)
party (2007–2010), eventually supported the establishment of the
Children’s Ombudsman and even considered it a spearhead of his youth
policy.49 The latter also reﬂects the positive view of Rouvoet towards
(reporting under) the CRC. He recognised the CRC as the starting point
for his youth policy immediately after he had taken ofﬁce.50 The CRC
was explicitly regarded as the foundation for the Policy Programme of
Youth and Families, All Chances for All Children.51 He even spoke
about ‘his’ Convention and called himself the ‘joint-owner’ of the
CRC.52 Rouvoet was also personally involved in the process of state
reporting and approached reporting as an inspiration and a boost rather
than a burden. Reporting was also used in this period to create
44 Interview K.
45 Interview C.
46 Interviews 5, 8, 11, 54, 98, C, D, J, M, W. Note that several political parties already
propagated the establishment of a Children’s Ombudsman before the 1999 COs.
‘Pleidooi Raadgever Kinderen’ [Plea for Children’s Counselor], NRC Handelsblad,
15 September 1999, 5.
47 Respectively Carla van Os and Majorie Kaandorp. Interview M.
48 Interview 54.
49 Interview 8. TK 2009/10, nr. 32, 1385–92 at 1387–88.
50 TK 2006/07, 31001, nr. 1, 1.
51 ‘Alle Kansen Voor Alle Kinderen: Programma Jeugd en Gezin 2007-2011’ [All Chances
for All Children Programme Youth and Families 2007–2011], attached to TK 2006/07,
31001, nr. 5, 9, 38, 47.
52 See the speech during the children’s rights summit on 20 November 2009 in The Hague.
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/toespraken/2009/11/20/kinderrech
tentop-in-leiden.html
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a moment of (media) attention for children’s rights and to raise aware-
ness of the issues involved.53
Example 2: The Abolishment of Life Imprisonment for Minors
The COs of both 1999 and 2004 recommended that the government of
the Netherlands outlaw the possibility of imposing life imprisonment on
minors.54 Following this recommendation, a bill was proposed by the
Dutch government to amend the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and the Youth Care Act to exclude the possibility of imposing
life imprisonment.55 The Explanatory Memorandum to the legislative
proposal referred to the COs and mentioned that the bill was proposed in
order to make Dutch legislation conform to the CRC.56 The government
referred to the COs on other occasions as well (see Table 1).57 One
government ofﬁcial interviewed, who was closely involved in the drafting
of the bill, stated that the legislative amendment was a clear result of the
COs. This ofﬁcial argued that taking up this issue was a personal
initiative.58 The ofﬁcial perceived political space for this proposal and
anticipated that both the responsible minister and Parliament would
agree with it.59 The interviewed ofﬁcial argued that agreement was
relatively easy to secure because life imprisonment of minors was
a relative non-issue in the Netherlands and had never been applied in
practice.60 The interviewed ofﬁcial saw implementation of these COs
primarily as a symbolic act without actual (political) costs and conse-
quences. Be that as it may, it seems clear that the bill would not have been
adopted had the CRC Committee not recommended this, because it was
not considered an issue in the Netherlands.
53 Interviews 49, 54.
54 UN Doc. CRC/C/90 (1999), para. 30; UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (2004), para. 59.
55 TK 2005/06, 30332.
56 TK 2005/06, 30332, nr. 3, 19.
57 Minister for Youth and Families, Rouvoet, stated during the dialogue with the CRC
Committee in 2009 that the government had amended its legislation in accordance with
the COs. UN doc. CRC/C/SR.1376 (2010), para. 42. The Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin
of the Christian Democratic party (CDA), mentioned the CO during the discussion of the
bill in the Senate. EK 2007/08, nr. 15, 637–51 at 638.
58 Interview 81.
59 Bouchibti (of the Labour party or PvdA) noted that this legislative change did justice to
the rights of child in the CRC, while de Wit (SP) even stated that the CO had been
followed. TK 2006/07, nr. 56, 3197–205 at 3198, 3199, 3203.
60 TK 2005/06, 30332, nr. 3, 19.
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Example 3: Housing Juvenile Offenders Separately from Children
Who Are Institutionalised for Behavioural Problems
The CRC Committee also recommended, in its 2004 COs, that the joint
detention or housing of juvenile offenders with children who are insti-
tutionalised for behavioural problems should be avoided.61 Shortly after
a dialogue between the government delegation and the CRC Committee
in 2004, it was decided to house these two categories of minors
separately.62 The government argued in its CRC report that this decision
was made ‘partly in response’ to the CO.63 The then Minister of Justice,
Donner, (of the Christian Democratic party, CDA) mentioned that this
change would ‘at the same time’ implement the recommendation of the
CRC Committee.64 However, it would take until 1 January 2010 for the
process of separate housing to be completed. During this period, various
domestic actors kept pressure on the government to expedite this pro-
cess. Government ofﬁcials and NGO representatives that were inter-
viewed conﬁrmed that the CRC in general and the CO in particular
were two of the many factors that played a role in accelerating the
separate housing of these two categories of minors.65
This example illustrates how international criticism clearly coincided
with national politics and the broad wish of the government, Parliament,
and societal actors to halt the practice. Joint detention had already been
an issue in the Netherlands, widely discussed since the end of the 1990s.66
There was political resistance in Parliament concerning the issue.67
In addition, the media paid considerable attention to the matter and
especially to the situation of children with behavioural problems who,
61 UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (2004), para. 59(d).
62 The announcement of the decision was made only two weeks after the dialogue and only
four days after the adoption of the 2004 COs by the then Minister of Justice Donner. TK
2003/04, 28741, nr. 6, 4–5, 7. Theminister himself did not refer to the COs in this context,
nor did the Explanatory Memorandum to the bill refer to the 2004 COs or to the CRC.
The memorandum emphasised the changed societal views and a study of the Verwey
Jonker Institute as a starting point for the bill. TK 2005/06, 30644, nr. 3.
63 UN doc. CRC/C/NLD/3 (2008), paras. 271–5.
64 TK 2004/05, 28741, nr. 12, 2.
65 Interviews 8, 54, C, D, J, W.
66 The issue of joint detention had been talked about since the end of the nineties when the
Youth Custodial Institutions Act was passed. TK 1997/98, 26 016 B, 1, 2.
67 Already inMarch 2000, a motion proposed by Duijkers (of the Dutch labour party, PvdA)
was adopted by Parliament stating that it was undesirable that these two groups of
children were housed together. The government was requested to set up an investigation
as to the possibilities to address this situation. TK 1999/00, 26016, nr. 13. After this
motion, the issue was discussed several times in Parliament. TK 2003/04, 28741, nr. 8.
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according to journalists, had been unlawfully detained.68 More and more
criticism was expressed by various domestic actors, including organisa-
tions of parents and magistrates in juvenile courts. The latter, for exam-
ple, presented a manifesto concerning the issue.69 Human rights and
children’s rights NGOs in the Netherlands, including the Dutch Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights (NJCM) and the Dutch section of Defence
for Children International, also lobbied on the issue. Many of these
domestic actors used the CRC and the COs as a supporting argument
(see also Table 1).70 The implementation of this COwas also facilitated by
the separate Minister for Youth and Families (2007–2010), who regarded
the issue as important, and the related ministry.71
Example 4: The Prohibition of Corporal Punishment
In the 1999 and 2004 COs the CRC Committee recommended that the
Dutch Government take legislative measures to explicitly prohibit cor-
poral punishment.72 On 28 September 2005, Parliament adopted a bill
banning parental violence, including corporal punishment, psychologi-
cal abuse, and degrading treatment.73 The full 2004 COs were repro-
duced in the Explanatory Memorandum to the legislative proposal.74
The then Dutch Minister of Justice, Donner, made clear that the bill
would implement the 2004 COs as well as similar recommendations of
the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) and the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.75 In a letter of 25 June 2003, Donner
had already noted that he was (still) not in favour of a legal
prohibition.76 During the dialogue with the CRC Committee on
15 January 2004, the Dutch delegation pronounced that the government
68 See e.g. the front page article by Frederiek Weeda, ‘Anouk Zit Onterecht in de Cel’
[Anouk Is Wrongfully Locked Up], NRC Next (2 September 2009), 1, 4–5.
69 Raad voor de Rechtspraak, ‘Kinderrechters inNederland Luiden deNoodklok’ [Magistrates
in Juvenile Courts in the Netherlands Sound the Alarm], 10 February 2004. www
.nieuwsbank.nl/inp/2004/02/10/R243.htm
70 See e.g. the National Audit Ofﬁce that referred to the 2004 COs in a letter about youth
custodial institutions. TK 2009/10, 31839, nr. 48, 2. TheMPVoordewind (of the Christian
Union party, or CU) referred to the ‘request’ of the CRC Committee as well. See TK 2009/
10, 31839, nr. 54, 12.
71 Interviews 8, J.
72 UN Doc. CRC/C/90 (1999), para. 17. UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (2004), para. 44(d).
73 UN doc. CRC/C/NLD/3 (2008), para. 144.
74 TK 2005/06, 30316, nr. 3, 1–2.
75 TK 2005/06, 30316, nr. 4, 3.
76 TK 2002/03, just 030599.
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was of the opinion that the existing provisions in the Dutch Civil Code
were sufﬁcient. The delegation, however, did mention that the issue was
heavily debated at the domestic level, and that the position was not
deﬁnitive and could change.77 On 13 February 2004, less than a month
after the dialogue, the Minister of Justice made clear that he had
changed his opinion.78
What is then the actual role of the COs in the legislative change?
On the one hand, ministers mentioned several times that the proposed
legislative change would implement the COs.79 MPs extensively referred
to the 2004 COs during the discussion of the bill prohibiting corporal
punishment.80 On the other hand, Minister of Justice Donner stated that
the recommendations of the CRC Committee and other actors, such as
the ECSR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
were not the most important reason for the bill. Rather, Minister Donner
pointed to the prevention of child abuse as the primary driver for the
legislative change.81 On a later occasion, the minister noted that the
legislative change was ‘partly’ the result of the recommendations of
‘several’ international organisations.82 Whereas one interviewee held
that the ban would not have been established had the committee not
recommended it, government ofﬁcials argued that the legislative propo-
sal was not directly the result of the CO.83 They pointed to the parlia-
mentary debate since the end of the 1990s. In the view of these
interviewed government ofﬁcials, the COs primarily supported the intro-
duction and eventual adoption of the bill. One government ofﬁcial also
pointed to the important role of an ofﬁcial of the Ministry of Justice who
was personally dedicated to the issue and had tried to convince the
77 UN doc. CRC/C/SR.929 (2004), para. 72.
78 No reference was made to the COs in relation to this announcement. TK 2003/04, 28345,
nr. 8, 2.
79 The then Minister of Youth and Families, Rouvoet, made clear that the proposed
legislative change implemented the COs. TK 2006/07, 31015, nr. 1, 2, and TK 2003/04,
29284, nr. 3, 1.
80 For references by the political parties PvdA, VVD, and CDA to the COs in their written
questions about the bill, see TK 2005/06, 30316, nr. 5, 2–3, 10. Several MPs made clear
that, with the act, the Netherlands would ﬁnally comply with the CRC. See TK 2005/06,
nr. 106, 6487–500 at 6489.
81 TK 2005/06, 30316, nr. 6, 2. Likewise, the minister did not point to the COs during the
discussion of the bill in Parliament. He onlymentioned the 2006 General Comment of the
CRC Committee as well as the recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe. See TK 2005/06, nr. 106, 6487–500 at 6495–7.
82 EK 2006/07, 30316, nr. B, 2.
83 Interviews K, 47, 67, 98.
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Minister of Justice to introduce a legal prohibition.84 The fact that
extensive attention had been paid to the issue of corporal punishment,
both at the regional and international level, at the time the matter was
being debated in the Dutch Parliament, was also considered important.
The CO and other recommendations thus bolstered the arguments for
the opponents of corporal punishment, thereby creating a window of
opportunity for and accelerating the introduction of the bill.
The ‘CRC Exception’ Explained
The CRC COs show a better record of implementation in the
Netherlands than the COs of other UN human rights treaty bodies.
This begs an explanation. The earlier theoretical overview presented
two explanations for the domestication of COs. On the basis of these
two premises, the following hypotheses can be formulated to account for
the ‘CRC exception’. First, government ofﬁcials might see the CRC
Committee as more authoritative and legitimate than the other human
rights treaty bodies. Ofﬁcials are consequently persuaded or pulled
towards compliance by the COs of the CRC Committee to a greater
extent than is the case for the other treaty bodies. Second, the level of
domestic and transnational mobilisation and advocacy might be higher
in relation to the COs of the CRC Committee. As a result of this the
government is under more pressure to implement the CRC COs than
those of other treaty bodies. This section examines whether these two
hypotheses are conﬁrmed by the views of Dutch government ofﬁcials,
and may indeed explain the different position of the CRC.
Hypothesis 1: The CRC Committee Is More Authoritative
Government ofﬁcials that were interviewed were almost equally critical
about the functioning of the six different treaty bodies. They were rather
negative about the usefulness, legitimacy, and persuasiveness of the treaty
bodies.85 Government ofﬁcials, for example, pointed to the basic and
limited knowledge of several treaty body members about the national
context and the poor preparation of some members.86 Ofﬁcials also
lamented the one-sided approach of treaty bodies and the fact that they
84 Interview 47.
85 Gras also noted similar aspects in J. Gras,Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2001).
86 Interviews 5, 8, 13, 19, 61, 66, 79, 91, 93.
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easily take over information and criticism of NGOs.87 Moreover, some of
the interviewed government ofﬁcials had the feeling that some of the COs
were completed before the actual dialogue took place, which in their view
also hampered the authority of treaty bodies.88 Several ofﬁcials argued
that the treaty bodies lacked independence and that the nature of the
process was political.89 All of this corresponds with Koskenniemi’s
observation that those serving in international legal institutions are
essentially engaged with politics.90
The government ofﬁcials were slightly more critical about the func-
tioning, quality, and authority of the CRC Committee. One government
ofﬁcial even counted the CRC Committee among the ‘activist’ commit-
tees that did not always keep a close eye on the text of the CRC.91 Some
ofﬁcials noted that the dialogue between the government and the CRC
Committee was usually rather emotional and based on expert members’
hobbyhorses and personal feelings instead of the facts and data presented
by the government.92 Some ofﬁcials even held that the CRC Committee
was undeservedly critical and tendentious and in some instances
approached the state delegation without respect. They speciﬁcally singled
out the attack of the Indonesian chair during the dialogue in 1999,
allegedly based on personal feelings related to past colonialism.93 One
ofﬁcial spoke about ‘sneering and conceited remarks’ about the ‘rotten
policy’ in the Netherlands.94 In addition, it was noted that the great
majority of expert members of the CRC Committee had not read the
report and did not seem interested in the discussion but primarily in
other issues, such as their return ﬂight or submission of their expense
account.95
Several government ofﬁcials indicated their disappointment that the
discussions in 1999 and 2004 in particular also focused on issues which
were not especially related to the CRC, such as homosexuality, abortion,
euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and the Netherlands’ drugs policy.96
Interviewed government ofﬁcials and NGO representatives both
87 Interviews 5, 8, 13, 24, 57, 79, 92.
88 Interviews 19, 42, 59, 67.
89 Interviews 19, 49, 67.
90 See Chapter 2 of this book.
91 Interview 76.
92 Interviews 47, 57, 67.
93 Interviews 47, 81.
94 Interview 81.
95 Interviews 47, 81, 92.
96 Interviews 47, 54, 81, 89.
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lamented the absence of a substantive in-depth discussion on the many
issues presented to them. The COs were said to be surprisingly short and
lacking argumentation.97
The views of Dutch government ofﬁcials and other interviewees illus-
trate that the different position of the COs of the CRC Committee cannot
be explained by the fact that the committee is seen as more authoritative
than the other treaty bodies or because there is a compliance pull coming
from its COs. Dutch government ofﬁcials have not been compelled or
persuaded to act only because of a recommendation of the CRC
Committee. The COs have never been a sufﬁcient cause on their own.
That is to say, hardly any policy or legislative measures were taken solely
as a result of the COs. The four aforementioned examples illustrate that
other (domestic) factors are required in order for the government to
implement a CO. The next subsection will evaluate whether or not the
mobilisation of domestic actors is an important prerequisite for imple-
mentation of the COs.
Hypothesis 2: The Mobilisation of Domestic Actors Peaks
in Relation to the COs of the CRC Committee
The four examples in the previous section suggest that COs might
eventually be implemented when they are taken up and lobbied by
domestic actors, whether NGOs, Parliament, or the media. In these
four instances, the COs were a contributory cause of the follow-up
measures together with many other international and national factors,
such as judgements of (international) courts, NGO advocacy, and the
commitment of individual government ofﬁcials or MPs. The examples
also illustrate that implementation of COs often required a years-long
political process. Domestic actors needed to demonstrate themselves as
willing and able to be persistent, spending time and attention on the issue
over a long period. The examples show that parliamentary support in
particular was often an essential intervening variable for the implemen-
tation of COs. This is also illustrated by Table 1, which demonstrates that
the COs that were (partly) implemented were often referred to byMPs on
several occasions.
97 The 2009 COs e.g. included the following concern and recommendation: ‘The Committee
is concerned about the access to health care for migrant children without a residence
permit. The Committee recommends that the State party take appropriate measures to
make sure that all children in its territory have access to basic health care.’UNDoc. CRC/
C/NLD/CO/3 (2009), paras. 51–2.
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Another factor, also to obtain Parliament’s attention, was the sustained
lobbying by NGOs. The COs of the CRC Committee were frequently
used by children’s rights NGOs and other domestic actors to support
their arguments or legitimise their work.98 In this way, the CRC
Committee supported domestic actors in framing their advocacy for
legal and policy change in terms of human rights. COs thus offered
a legal basis for NGO criticism and provided them with better opportu-
nities for lobby and advocacy.99 The ﬁndings of this research are con-
sistent with a study conducted by Heyns and Viljoen about the impact of
UN human rights treaties in twenty countries. They concluded that NGO
involvement and mobilisation coupled with media coverage constitute
‘an enabling domestic environment’ which enhances the impact of the
treaties and the COs.100 The ﬁndings also mirror the boomerang effect
previously described. That is to say, NGOs often highlighted issues in
their alternative reports to the treaty bodies that they were already
lobbying for domestically. They did this deliberately, with the idea of
obtaining a useful and authoritative recommendation that gave extra
strength and legitimacy to their claims. In this way, they used the process
of reporting strategically.
Domestic mobilisation was practically absent with respect to the pro-
cess of reporting under the other ﬁve treaty bodies. Table 2 shows that the
COs of the CRC Committee were mentioned in more documents sent to
Parliament by the government (on 24 occasions) than all the COs of the
ﬁve other treaty bodies together (on 17 occasions). The same holds true
for Parliament, with 56 parliamentary papers referring to the COs of the
CRC Committee, as opposed to only 41 for the ﬁve other treaty bodies.
98 Woll noted that COs served as ‘a guide or frame of reference’. Lisa Woll, ‘Reporting to
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: A Catalyst for Domestic Debate and
Policy Change’, International Journal of Children’s Rights, 8/1 (2000), 71–81 at 72–3, 76.
See also Gerison Lansdown, ‘The Reporting Process under the Convention on the Rights
of the Child’, in Philip Alston and James Crawford, eds, The Future of UNHuman Rights
Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 113–28 at 116;
Walter Kälin, ‘Examination of State Reports’, in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein, eds,
UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, 16–71 at 40.
99 Andrew Clapham, ‘UN Human Rights Reporting Procedures: An NGO Perspective’, in
Alston and Crawford, eds, The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 175–98; Scott Leckie, ‘The Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a System Needing
Reform’, also in Alston and Crawford, Treaty Monitoring, 129–44.
100 Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, ‘The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights
Treaties on the Domestic Level’, Human Rights Quarterly, 23/3 (2001), 483–535 at
522–4.
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Media coverage of the reporting process under the CRC was also sig-
niﬁcantly higher.
It is particularly noteworthy that there has been a Dutch Children’s
Rights Coalition of nine NGOs, chaired by the Dutch section of Defence
for Children International, that has speciﬁcally focused on the domestic
implementation of the CRC. This coalition has used the process of
reporting strategically and has embedded the process in its broader
political lobby at the national level. This also reﬂects the observation in
the Introduction that human rights are frequently ‘instrumentalised’.101
For instance, the coalition has sent its comments on the government’s
reaction to the COs to Parliament and to the responsible minister. It has
Table 2.Domestic Mobilisation in relation to the COs from 1995 to 2011 in
the Netherlands
ICERD
COs
1998,2000,
2004, 2010
ICESCR
COs 1998,
2006, 2010
ICCPR COs
2001, 2009
CEDAW
COs 2001,
2007, 2010
CAT COs
2000, 2007
CRC COs
1999, 2004,
2009
Government
treaty 71 123 354 221 139 463
COs (5) (0) (1) (10) (1) (24)
Parliament
treaty 31 77 186 151 84 444
COs (7) (4) (7) (21) (2) (56)
National
courts
treaty 17 127 1279 39 128 853
COs (0) (4) (0) (5) (1) (2)
NGO
lobbying
Limited Practically
non-
existent
Limited /
practically
non-
existent
Active Practically
non-
existent
Active
Media
coverage
(newspaper
articles)
8 1 22 24 5 37
Source: J. Krommendijk, The Domestic Impact and Effectiveness of the Process of
State Reporting under UN Human Rights Treaties in the Netherlands, New
Zealand and Finland (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), 258.
101 Chapter 1, pp. 2, 4 and 6.
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also organised conferences and seminars to discuss follow-up to COs
with MPs or with individual ministers. In addition, there have been
structural half-yearly meetings between the coalition and an interdepart-
mental governmental working group on children’s rights. Such NGO
activities have hardly ever happened for the process of reporting under
the other treaties.
Children’s rights NGOs were also relatively successful lobbying on the
basis of COs. The COs that led to some changes or follow-up measures
mirror the policy issues that NGOs lobbied on.102 The NGO lobby was
often a reason for MPs to allude to COs or to put forward a legislative
proposal, as was the case with the Children’s Ombudsman. Likewise,
NGOs were crucial for generating media attention. The signiﬁcant role of
NGOs in relation to the CRC can be explained by the historic connection
of NGOs to the CRC, including involvement in the negotiations of the
text of the CRC. The CRC Committee has the closest links with NGOs of
all the treaty bodies.103 In addition, there has been a Geneva-based NGO
Group for the CRC (nowworking under the name Child Rights Connect)
which has provided information and training about the process of
reporting and linked domestic NGOs with the CRC Committee.
Another important explanation for the higher level of domestic mobi-
lisation in relation to the CRC is the salience of the issue of children’s
rights among politicians. Children’s rights meet a clear response in wider
society. Nobody wants to be seen as not in favour of children’s rights. It is
widely acknowledged that children are by deﬁnition in a vulnerable posi-
tion and in need of protection. The salience of children’s rights is well
illustrated by the case of Mauro in 2011. The boy Mauro faced expulsion
to his country of origin, Angola, after having lived in the Netherlands in
a foster family for eight years. This case was extensively covered in the
media. Parliamentary attention was considerable and some MPs, the
Children’s Ombudsman, and the Dutch National UNICEF Committee
102 Majorie Kaandorp, a former representative of the Dutch section of Defence for Children,
outlined several issues for which the Dutch Children’s Rights Coalition had lobbied both
at the national level and among the CRCCommittee and which were included in the COs
2004. Among them were several implemented COs, including three of the four examples
discussed above, omitting the issue of life imprisonment. Majorie Kaandorp, ‘Het
Bondgenootschap tussen Niet-Gouvernementele Organisaties en het VN-Verdrag
inzake de Rechten van het Kind’ [The Alliance between NGOs and the CRC], in
Defence for Children, Nederland Rapporteert over Kinderrechten [The Netherlands
Reports about Children’s Rights] (2004), 33–6 at 35.
103 A.F. Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads
(2001), 46. www.bayefsky.com/report/ﬁnalreport.pdf
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as well as NGOs such as the Dutch section of Defence for Children
International all framed the issue in terms of children’s rights and
a violation of the CRC.104 The Mauro case exempliﬁed that children’s
rights and issues are relatively easy to mobilise around, because these
issues have a built-in pressure group and constituency.105 In addition,
children’s rights are often perceived as less controversial and contested
than other rights, such as prisoner’s rights or the rights of (ethnic)
minorities and asylum seekers. There seems to be a near consensus
among politicians and the public that children’s rights are worth promot-
ing and protecting. Nonetheless, when it comes down to their actual
implementation and the details, there is more divergence in views.
Another important reason for the higher impact of the CRC is the lack
of another treaty or supervisory mechanism in the ﬁeld of children’s
rights. Thus, the CRC is the unrivalled frame of reference for children’s
rights. The consequence of this is that domestic actors, and especially
NGOs, are almost exclusively focused on the UN system and couch their
demands in the language of children’s rights under the CRC. By contrast,
for nearly all the other UN human rights treaties there are authoritative
or speciﬁc equivalents at the regional governance level. The substitute of
the Convention against Torture (CAT) and the CAT Committee is the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, which has a more
powerful monitoring committee.106 Likewise, the equivalent of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at the European
level is the European Convention on Human Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.107 The Racial Discrimination
Convention (ICERD) is eclipsed by EU legislation in the ﬁeld of racial
discrimination and more speciﬁc Council of Europe monitoring bodies,
104 See e.g. ‘Kinderombudsman over Mauro’ [Children’s Ombudsman about Mauro],
28 October 2011. www.dekinderombudsman.nl/86/volwassen/nieuws/kinderombudsman-
over-mauro/?id=54; ‘Uitzetting van Mauro in Strijd met VN-Kinderrechtenverdrag’
[Mauro’s Expulsion Violates the CRC], 28 October 2011. www.unicef.nl/nieuws/berich
ten/2011/10/uitzetting-van-mauro-in-strijd-met-vn-kinderrechtenverdrag
105 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 357–8.
106 Redactioneel, ‘Hebben Ze het Wel Goed Gezien? Hoe Om te Gaan met Oordelen van
Internationale Mensenrechtencomités’ [Editorial, ‘Have They Really Seen It Well? How
to Deal with Judgements of International Human Rights Committees], NTM/NJCM-
Bulletin 37/4 (2012), 387–9 at 389.
107 Krommendijk, ‘De Beperkte Effectiviteit’. See also Jan-Peter Loof, ‘Het Parlement, de
Mensenrechten en de Zorgvuldigheid in het Wetgevingsproces’ [The Parliament,
Human Rights and Accuracy in the Legislative Process], in Roel de Lange, ed.,
Wetgever en Grondrechten [The Legislator and Fundamental Rights] (Nijmegen: Wolf
Legal, 2008), 85–127 at 116–7.
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such as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.108
Even with regard to the Women’s Convention (CEDAW), EU legislation
in the ﬁelds of gender equality, trafﬁcking, and violence against women
has diminished the added value of the convention in the Dutch
context.109 Similarly, the European Social Charter and conventions of
the International Labour Organization may outweigh, even if they do not
fully substitute for, the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights.110
Conclusion
The general question addressed in this chapter was whether UN human
rights treaty bodies act as engines for incorporating universal norms at
the domestic level. I have argued that such incorporation has hardly
taken place with respect to the process of state reporting under the
majority of the UN human rights treaties. The CRC is a positive excep-
tion to this. In several instances the CRC COs have led to a policy or
legislative change, often in conjunction with many other interlinking
factors. On these occasions, the content of the CRC COs primarily
supported, legitimised, or strengthened the arguments of domestic actors
in domestic (parliamentary) debates and political decision-making.
In this way, the mobilisation of these COs pushed or accelerated the
adoption of policy or legislative measures. Accordingly, the rather exten-
sive political mobilisation of domestic actors in relation to children’s
rights and the CRC is an important explanation for the positive exception
that the CRC COs and the CRC Committee have been. Children’s rights
NGOs in particular have played a key role in the domestic implementa-
tion of COs and, hence, the promotion of children’s rights.
108 Krommendijk, Domestic Impact and Effectiveness.
109 R. Janse and Jet Tigchelaar, ‘Het vrouwenrechtencomité: niet bekend en niet geacht’
[The Women’s Committee: Unknown and Unrespected], in Nienke Doornbos,
Niek Huls, and Wibo van Rossum, eds, Rechtspraak van Buiten (Deventer: Kluwer,
2010), 309–17 at 314; Marjolein van den Brink, ‘The CEDAW After All These Years:
Firmly Rooted in Dutch Clay?’, in Anne Hellum and Henriette Sinding Aasen, eds,
Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 482–510 at 496, 502.
110 Reiding noted that the Dutch government has been rather positive about the ILO-system
and has referred to it as ‘undoubtedly the most effective . . . among the worldwide
systems’ and ‘doing a great job in the ﬁeld of realising economic and social rights’.
Hilde Reiding, The Netherlands and the Development of International Human Rights
Instruments (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2007), 151.
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Ignatieff has characterised the growing development of international
human rights norms and monitoring institutions as a ‘human rights
revolution’, while Koskenniemi has referred to a proliferation of
rights.111 Although this chapter nuances the extent to which states are
affected by such a revolution and the extent to which this is instigated at
the international (UN) level, the ﬁndings in this chapter hint at
a children’s rights revolution in the Netherlands. This revolution should
not necessarily be seen in terms of the material realisation of children’s
rights. Rather, it refers to the extent to which domestic actors couch their
political demands in the language of children’s rights and use interna-
tional standards and monitoring processes to back this up. This is also
illustrative of the political dimension of the implementation of interna-
tional norms. By revealing that domestic politics and domestic mobilisa-
tion matter, this chapter corroborates Koskenniemi’s thesis that
international law should not regard politics as opposed to international
law. Rather, domestic politics are an important prerequisite for interna-
tional law’s function and effectiveness.
111 Michael Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: House of Anansi, 2007); see
Chapter 2 of this book.
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